Abstract:
of the Eastern Partnership initiative, the EU attempts to play the role of an ambiguous and influential actor, being able to change the way of thinking and democratize states in the region. Due to the fact that the EU cannot offer them an eventual membership perspective, it pursues 'milieu goals' -of indirectly shaping the external environment by means of diplomacy and soft power. Third, soft power occupies a special position in the policy of the European Union toward the said region. Not only is it reflected at the phase of conceptualization in the approach to the sensitive neighbourhood area, but in its implementation as well. The implementation of such a policy, which also arises out of the lack of well-functioning backing of hard power, manifests itself primarily in the application of non-power and non-compulsory instruments.
The paper attempts to answer a few research questions: What does the term of soft power mean in EU policy? What are the main aims, assumptions, and instruments of the European Union's soft power toward the region? What role does the Eastern Partnership play as an instrument of EU soft power? What is the effectiveness of the EU's soft power in the policy toward Eastern Partnership countries?
Soft power as a theoretical approach to the EU's policy towards Eastern

Partnership states
Soft power is treated as dominating theoretical approach and as the main research tool serving as a concept basis or as a starting point for other theories. It boils down to the ability to shape the preferences of the other members of the international system with the use of attracting force, its attractiveness, rather than the application of coercion and force. The author of the term is an American researcher of international relations, J. S. Nye, who introduced it into the literature on the subject in 1990 from the field of international relations, in his work titled Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Nye, 1990a) .
Soft power is a manifestation of new tendencies relating to the shaping of the international order. As a result of the changes, the discussion revived on limiting the use of hard power as an instrument of foreign policy while the significance of law and international regimes, i.e. the use of soft power in keeping international security increased. Furthermore, the appearance of soft power is a kind of response of the West to the articulation of a new type of challenges and threats, so-called non-military or asymmetric threats, the most On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe Issue no. 26/2018 81 important being terrorism, cyber terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nationalism, ethnic nationalisms, economic crises, climate change, and organized crime. In the case of the European Union, the soft power approach will make it possible to understand and determine its potential in global politics.
The reason behind my selecting and using the concept of soft power as the main framework for researching the EU's policy toward the Eastern Partnership countries in this article is its specificity allowing it to aptly translate into the manner the European Union functions in the said region. The concept has more capacity and greater elasticity than other theories that identify the role of the European Union in the world, although encompassing within its range similar approaches (civilian and normative power). Furthermore, due to the fact that both the EU's policy in its neighbouring states and the idea of the Eastern Partnership countries itself belong to the sphere of external relations, it is assumed that soft power constitutes a certain way or method of foreign policy, of exposing its qualities/attractiveness but also its interests arising out of such determinants formulated by J.S. Nye as culture, values, and foreign policy that is implemented on their basis. Unlike the concept of civilian (Duchêne, 1972) and normative power (Manners, 2002) , until now soft power has not been used as a method for a broader analysis of the EU's policy in the region under discussion.
The assumptions of researching soft power include: a given subject's possibility to use soft instruments of a peaceful, political, diplomatic, and cultural character, i.e. noncoercive means in general terms (a reference to the concept of civilian power) and their use by the subject to influence the outside environment; building on the global catalogue of generally accepted values; promoting democratic values; shaping of the ideological nature of international relations (normative power); using its own civilization attractiveness and stirring the interest in its cultural potential; having an effective foreign policy that is based on generally accepted values. Europe. The EU's soft power instruments can, therefore, be treated as a natural and logical supplement of mechanisms that the European Union has been using on the international arena so far.
The specificity of the European Union's policy in the international sphere implies one's adducing to the liberal approach in international studies as a theoretical basis for research. Due to the fact that the aim of the European Union is the democratisation and stabilisation of its neighbouring countries through the use of soft instruments: political, diplomatic, and economic, as well as the policy of conditionality as the primary strategy toward its neighbours and the export of the western model, i.e. the market economy and liberal democracy, the components of the strategy are in line with the liberal theory of international relations.
Despite one's treating soft power as an element of a broader European Union policy in the region, it should be kept in mind that the instruments it uses, inter alia those from among the key projects -the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnershipdo not belong to the manifestations of soft power only, because soft power is an element of international influence, in other words an element of this organization toward the region of the neighbourhood that is subject to the influence or even rivalry for the sphere of influence with other participants of international relations, primarily Russia. This seems relevant to the theory of international influence proposed by K. J. Holstie (Holstie, 1994) . The theory, in turn, refers to other than liberal theoretical approaches, namely realism.
However, as a rule, the European Union is not viewed as a traditional/hard power; however, its transformation is noted, one that consists of departing from promoting only a peace project (manifested in using civil means), and heading toward an entity competing for geopolitical influence. This is evident in reference to the necessity to strengthen soft power The main goal of the EaP, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration, is to create all necessary conditions in order to accelerate political association and also economic integration between the EU and the interested partner countries. The EU has a great interest in seeking stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern border.
The Eastern Partnership is the most developed political initiative which is associated with a set of activities offering soft cooperation mechanisms. This idea combines both political and diplomatic instruments, cultural and education, economic and financial, but also stability ones in neighbouring states in Eastern Europe. The EU perceives eastern partners through the prism of the ability to strengthen its economic, political and energy security and the realization of its soft power policy.
For those reasons, the EU tries to continue cooperation at political, economic and security levels, while also working towards strengthening good administration, market economy and sustainable development. From the EU's perspective, applying soft power strategy by maintaining of active neighbourhood policy and the stabilization of each dimension of the European security architecture is essential to becoming an important actor in the region.
According to the former president of the European Commission, J. M. Barroso, the Eastern Partnership represents a significant progress in comparison to the European Neighbourhood Policy and reflects a soft power projection in the post-Soviet area (Runner, 2008) . This partnership shows what could be called the power of soft power, the ability of the EU to attract others and bring about changes in societies. According to Barroso, "prosperity and stability in the 21 st century will be brought about by economics, not by missiles; by political dialogue, not by demonstrations of force". He also underlined the EU's ambition to transform the post-Soviet countries into Western-type democracies and market economies, hitting a rare note of assertiveness in EU foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia.
Furthermore, as Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, said, the European Union will not apologize for the "civilizational attraction" of its Eastern Partnership project, a
Polish-Swedish initiative that Russia claims is a front for an attempt to secure for the bloc a "sphere of influence" (Polish FM).
The EU's use of its soft power is trying to assist partners in their modernization efforts via their convergence with EU standards and rules. The main objective of the EaP is to 
The effectiveness of the EU's soft power in the policy toward Eastern
Partnership countries
The efficiency evaluation of the EU's soft power policy in the region of the six Eastern Partnership countries is not an easy task. This problem is very complex. It depends, firstly, on the specificity of the phenomenon of soft power, the hybrid structure of the EU's foreign policy and the differences between the six Eastern Europe countries. The other determinants are the capabilities and the will of the beneficiaries of the Eastern Partnership to At present, as a result of asymmetry in their adapting to the requirements and drawing closer to the European Union, these countries are divided into 'associated states' (signatories of the affiliation treaties with the European Union -Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) and those not in favour of integration (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus).
As a consequence, the EaP is divided into those countries that signed Association
Agreements with the EU and those preferring to maintain their loyalty to Eurasian integration. The first group consists of three states (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), willing and able to integrate with the EU within the proposed initiatives. Therefore, the EaP has What is the reason for the weak effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership? Firstly, there is a growing feeling that the AA is less relevant than the populations of member states expected. It is not difficult to see the striking clash of views between EU bodies and EaP governments, revealing a serious lack of mutual understanding. EaP states are expected to act as 'accession countries', restricted from accessing EU structural funds and other development money that could greatly improve their economic resilience. History has proved that the perspective of integration was the greatest guarantee of successful internal changes in applicant countries. Unfortunately, the EU is unable to ensure membership for countries of the eastern neighbourhood, even in the long-term perspective. Therefore, the lack of a (Kelley, 2006, p. 49) . In other words, EaP citizens have yet to see the benefits of membership.
On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership as an initiative focused first of all on the EU exerting its influence as a soft power, it is not a very original response to the security challenges in the Eastern neighbourhood because, in fact, it is a continuation of the ENP, which was launched some years ago. The EU's cooperation with its Eastern neighbours is to lead to the transfer of good EU practices and standards in the fields of trade, economy and politics, and its pace will depend on the changes taking place in those countries, and on the partners' expectations. The hard security issues related to regional conflicts (Ukraine-Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria) are not included in the agenda. It needs to be emphasized, however, that without deeper involvement in conflict resolution there, the EU will not be able to achieve its own interests in the Eastern neighbourhood. In this context, the EaP could only play a supporting role, providing a forum for dialogue and instruments for the Europeanization of the six countries (Cornell, Benes, 2009 ). This may, hypothetically, enable the Union to make full use of its soft power and thereby indirectly contribute to the improvement of international security in the region (Piskorska, 2014, p. 206) . However, as an initiative designed to contribute to the transformation of the Eastern neighbours into democratic states with transparent and reliable market economies, the Eastern Partnership could have a strategic significance for the stability and security of both the countries of the Eastern dimension of the ENP and the EU as a whole.
We can unfortunately also notice that despite the initial aim to create a ring of friendly states around the EU, the EaP ended up being perceived as a "ring of fire", which reveals the multiple flaws and ambiguities of the original concept. The strategic resolve to transform the EU's eastern neighbours is not as strong as it once was, while an assertive Russia "flexes its muscles" (Muntenau, 2017) .
The half-progress within the Eastern Partnership of the EU is also due to external factors, such as the EU debt and migration crisis or the revolutions in the Southern flank of the ENP which shifted the EU's attention away from its eastern neighbours. Nevertheless, there has been a certain overall progress in the economic sphere of the Eastern (Sabbati, 2013, p. 3) . At the same time, regarding the democratic environment within this region, the evolution is quite backwards (except for Moldova and Georgia) (Sabbati, 2013, p. 4 The most striking sign of decline is the rising gap between plans for reform and actual results, growing political instability at home, rising external insecurities and foreign military threats.
All of this makes the original assumption that EaP states will be able to become a 'well governed ring of friends around EU' extremely optimistic. So far, however, visa liberalisation has been a powerful incentive in pushing for real reform.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the impact that the EU soft power policy has had on its neighbours is that the pace of progress is determined by the extent to which partners are willing to implement the necessary reforms; not coincidentally, many achievements have been met in the economic sphere, particularly in the field of commerce, and almost none in the areas of governance and democracy.
Conclusions
The analysis of the EU's soft power policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries has enabled us to verify the research hypotheses. Some of them have been confirmed only partially. Over the last dozen or so years, radical changes have indeed taken place in many countries neighbouring the European Union. One could notice both positive and negative tendencies. The former include reforms initiated by local authorities toward the rule of law, an increase in social justice and accountability, which was the reason for awarding the European Union the Nobel Prize in 2012. It should be kept in mind, however, that the changes did not take place as a result of the European Union's using soft power only, but, rather, they were the effect of the reforms undertaken. Although part of the EU's political culture is its conviction on the rightfulness of its actions and the ability to impose its own objectives onto other players, it has not so far found its implementation in all countries of the Eastern Partnership. The realization of the example to follow and the model of the promoter of development and democracy, as well as the provider of assistance, have been partially successful in the case of three countries: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which upon signing the association agreements and the deep free trade area agreements intensified their works for reform according to the direction shown.
Furthermore, with the continued significance of military force for international security, it would be difficult to have just the soft power of the European Union as the tool for positioning it as a regional power, for promoting its image and brand outside its borders.
Therefore, the European Union must progress towards equalising potentials arising from the assumptions of pragmatism. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain balance between idealism and realism and to stress the importance of the latter in order to relaunch the project. The
European Union willingly presents itself as a modernist entity that does not require force as a tool to achieve the position of a global player, pointing out to its role as a non-military power -an enlightened guide, a civil and normative power, including a propagator of principles of democracy and good rule, which comprehensively forms the concept of soft power.
However, it seems that the European Union's offer is inadequate to the expectations of some Eastern Partnership countries, which express their willingness to become members of the organization, e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which ambivalently perceive the realization of the EU's soft power. Moreover, building on the policy addressed to candidate countries or aspirant countries, the European Union does not present an offer to its neighbouring countries that is equally attractive. The EU's enlargement policy requirements toward Eastern European countries do not coincide with its proposal addressed to the states which already aspire to become EU member states. The lack of a precise offer can bring about a discouragement of potential candidates and make them turn, again, toward Russia, which would mark a defeat of the EU's eastern policy and the deterioration of the relations therewith (the case of Armenia).
Moreover, due to the lack of any significant involvement, and above all the willingness of member states, the EU has not contributed to stabilizing security in the region, especially in the context of solving the conflicts which exist there. This was proved by the Finally, it needs to be stressed that the Eastern Partnership countries form a natural region of soft influence of the European Union but also of other international actors, i.e.
Russia, which in recent years has been deliberately applying the tools of soft power without neglecting the hard tools, including the policies of force and energy, at the same time. The research shows that the EU's soft power and attractiveness could be threatened by Russia's activities toward the region. It can weaken the effectiveness and the image of the European Union in the Eastern Partnership countries in the long run. Russia's policy in Ukraine also proves that the geopolitical factor in international relations has been strengthening. This means that, at present, the European Union's idealistic paradigm is threatened.
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